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NOTE
DRAWING THE CURTAIN ON OPEN GOVERNMENT?
IN DEFENSE OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ACT'
I. INTRODUCTION
James Madison said, "A popular government, without
popular information, or the means for acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge
will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives."' Yet, to perform duties mandated by
the Constitution, a President may need to confer privately with
advisors and receive their insights in confidence, without fear
of their advice being tempered by concern for public
dissemination. To that end, the Supreme Court has recognized
the importance of protecting confidential presidential
communications. In United States v. Nixon, the Court found an
implicit constitutional basis for this protection, though such
protection is not absolute.! In Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services,' the Court utilized a balancing test to
© 2003 Carolyn Bingham Kello. All Rights Reserved.
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910), quoted in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l
Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 52 (D.D.C. 2002). Note that this famous
quote is frequently cited with reference to the open government statutes, as
demonstrated by its use in the Judicial Watch opinion.
2 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) [hereinafter Nixon I].
3 Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) [hereinafter Nixon II].
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consider potential disruption to the President's execution of
Article II powers when Congress sought access to the
President's confidential communications. The Court again used
a balancing test to resolve separation of powers issues raised in
Morrison v. Olson.4
Congress has also recognized the need to provide a
sphere of secrecy in presidential deliberations by exempting
certain presidential communications from the reach of the
"open government" statutes The open government statutes are
a group of regulatory laws that provide public access to the
workings of the federal government. Included among these
statutes is the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), a
procedural statute that regulates the establishment and use of
advisory committees by government officials. The open
government statutes protect a vital national interest, since only
an informed citizenry can satisfactorily perform its duties in a
representative democracy.7 FACA furthers this interest by
keeping the activities of advisory committees open to public
and congressional scrutiny and thus, at least aspirationally,
free from special interest control. Yet when applied to
presidential advisory groups, ostensibly its most critical
application, FACA risks failing its purpose of opening
government to the people. As judicial support wanes in the face
of constitutional concerns over FACA's scope, a recalcitrant
administration can easily evade compliance.
4 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) [hereinafter Morrison] (employing a
balancing test to resolve separation of powers issue and finding that Congress may
provide for judicial appointment of an independent counsel to investigate criminal
offenses within the federal government).
r Exceptions within the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and Government in the Sunshine Act, both
express and discretionary, provide for areas of presidential confidentiality. See
discussion infra text accompanying notes 31 and 32.
6 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-14 (2000) (enacted Oct. 6, 1972).
7 FOIA, one of the open government statutes which amended the
Administrative Procedures Act, was signed into law by President Johnson in 1966, who
said:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: a
democracy works best when the people have all the information that the
security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull the curtains of
secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public
interest.
Steven Goldberg, Freedom Paper No. 6: Public Access to Government Information, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/freedom/freedom6.htm (last visited Oct. 2,
2003).
Since FOIA's enactment, the Supreme Court has reinforced its essential
purpose to "ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic
society." NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
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Judicial Watch, Inc. v. National Energy Policy
Development Group (Judicial Watch)' exemplifies these issues,
casting light on both FACA's objectives and shortcomings. The
case is one of several brought in the D.C. District Court against
Vice President Richard Cheney and the National Energy Policy
Development Group (NEPDG) he headed Congress, as well as
several prominent and diverse national organizations, sought
access to the purpose, structure, membership, and records of
NEPDG meetings, which provided the policy advice behind the
National Energy Plan released in May of 2001.
In particular, the various plaintiffs seek to understand
the nature of the relationship between the NEPDG," and
private representatives of industry who also may have
contributed directly to the National Energy Plan through
interaction with the NEPDG. The administration of President
George W. Bush has thus far refused to provide much of the
information sought under FACA and under the Freedom of
Information Act."2 Consequently, the Judicial Watch case places
in sharp relief problematic issues of the scope and application
of FACA when an administration seeks to withhold
information.
Part II of this Note establishes the origin and purpose of
FACA, its odyssey through the courts, and its reception by
successive executive administrations since its introduction in
1972. Part III sets out issues raised by joined plaintiffs Judicial
Watch and the Sierra Club in their claims against Vice
President Cheney, the NEPDG, and its individual members.
" Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20,
52 (D.D.C. 2002) [hereinafter Judicial Watch].
9 Two cases were brought under FOIA, and since consolidated: Judicial
Watch, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Energy, No. 01-0981, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3572,
at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2002) and Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States Dep't of
Energy, 191 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2002).
10 Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, National Energy Policy: Reliable,
Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf (May 2001).
11 Authority for the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG)
terminated September 30, 2001. Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
12 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (enacted Sept. 6, 1966). According to the Natural
Resources Defense Council, in response to its FOIA request and lawsuit, as of May
2002, the Bush Administration had turned over approximately 13,500 records, many
heavily redacted, and withheld approximately 16,000 records. Natural Resources
Defense Council, NRDCs Review of the Bush Administration Energy Task Force
Records - More Info About the Records, What's Here and How it Got Here, available at
http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/taskforce/moreinfo.asp#whatsnot (last visited Aug. 23,
2003).
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Part IV examines the relative success of FACA, and how
actions by the courts and the executive branch may now erode
that success. Part V offers recommendations for how FACA can
continue to achieve its purpose of keeping the public and
Congress informed of the activities of government advisory
committees. Consistent judicial action in all FACA cases,
including those that touch on activities of presidential advisors,
will go along way towards assuring this result.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Advisory Committee Act
Attention towards the open government statutes'3
swelled in the aftermath of Watergate, as the public and
Congress reacted to the scandal by seeking greater
transparency and accountability from government." The open
,3 Authority for the statutes derives from Congress' power to create the
executive departments and their agencies. Congress may thus "be empowered to
legislate concerning ... public access to [the executive and agencies'] internal affairs,
though this power, as it applies to presidential communications, is limited to the extent
that the Judicial branch has found a constitutional basis for executive privilege."
Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1418-19 (1974). See
discussion infra Part II.B.1.
" The revelations of Watergate eventually drove President Nixon from office.
The scandal involved a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in the
Watergate building on June 17, 1972. In the course of the investigation of the break-in,
high level officials in the Nixon administration were implicated in the cover-up, as was
President Nixon himself, though he was never indicted. Attorney General Elliot
Richardson appointed Archibald Cox, a Harvard Law professor, Special Prosecutor.
Cox sought access to secret tapes the President had made of conversations in the
executive office.
President Nixon attempted to have Cox fired, ordering first Attorney
General Richardson and then the second in command, William Ruckelshaus, to do so.
Both men in turn refused, and resigned. Third in command, Solicitor General Robert
Bork, complied with the President's request, firing Cox. That series of events became
known as the Saturday Night Massacre, and increased the call from Congress for the
President's impeachment.
A new Special Prosecutor was appointed, Leon Jaworski, who named the
President an "unindicted co-conspirator" and renewed the demand for the tapes. A
criminal subpoena issued, which Nixon moved to quash. The district court denied the
President's motion to quash, and the Supreme Court stepped in, bypassing the court of
appeals and ruling unanimously that the President had to comply with the subpoena.
Congress, meanwhile, was holding impeachment hearings. After the
Supreme Court ruling, but before the culmination of those hearings, President Nixon
complied with the subpoena and then resigned. He was shortly thereafter pardoned by
President Gerald Ford. His departure in advance of criminal indictment leaves open
the question of whether a sitting President can ever be indicted on a criminal charge,
in light of his constitutional pardon power, which could feasibly be exercised on his own
behalf.
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government statutes include FACA, '" the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA),'" which regulates public access to
federal government documents, and the Government in the
Sunshine Act,'7 which regulates public attendance of federal
government meetings. The statutes seek to improve
government accountability by enabling greater direct public
participation'8 and work in conjunction with other provisions of
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which standardizes
agency practices in an effort towards greater uniformity.'9
With its passage in 1972, FACA codified existing
administrative practice" regarding advisory committee
management. FACA was aimed at bolstering public confidence
in government by alleviating public concern with special
interest sway over policy making.' Through FACA, Congress
sought to accomplish these goals by limiting the increasing
number of advisory committees and opening their activities to
public scrutiny.22
Because Congress intended to give FACA wide
regulatory reach,' it is broadly drafted with narrow exceptions,
such as those exempting any advisory committees of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Reserve, or local civic
groups.2 The Act distinguishes targeted advisory committees
'5 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-14 (2000).
16 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
17 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000) (enacted Sept. 13, 1976). See also Robert G. Vaughn,
Transparency - The Mechanisms: Open Government and Accountability, ISSUES OF
DEMOCRACY, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0800/ijde/vaughn.htm
(Aug. 2000). Also included among the open government statutes are the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), and
.paradoxically," the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). Id. (noting that all open
government statutes internalize the conflict between information access and privacy
and citing to Alan Westin's book, Privacy and Freedom, which "defines democracy and
authoritarianism in terms of information policy").
" See Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee
Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 456 (1997).
19 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000) (revision enacted Sept. 6, 1966)
(replacing 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1001(a), enacted June 11, 1946).
20 Croley & Funk, supra note 18, at 459-60 (discussing the Executive Order
issued by President Kennedy, Exec. Order No. 11,007 (1962), that predates the
statutory requirements of FACA). Interestingly, President Nixon issued a more
stringent set of guidelines for advisory committees, Exec. Order 11,671, 37 Fed. Reg.
11,307 (June 5, 1972) even as Congress was drafting the bill that was to become FACA.
21 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1972) (findings and purpose).
2 Croley & Funk, supra note 18, at 452.
23 Id. at 460.
24 5 U.S.C. app. § 4 (applicability; restrictions).
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from agencies or groups organized for other primary purposes,
which only incidentally provide advice to the President.25 The
Act defines an advisory committee as "any committee, board,
council, conference, panel, task force or other similar group, or
any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof' established by
statute or established or utilized by the President or one or
more agencies for the purpose of obtaining advice for the
President or for one or more agencies or officers of the Federal
Government, but excluding any group made up solely of
Federal officers or employees."6 FACA requires continuing
congressional review of each advisory committee to ensure that
it fulfills its defined purpose, that its membership is "fairly
balanced in terms of the points of view represented," and that
its advice will be free of any "inappropriate[] influenc[es] by the
appointing authority or by any special interest."7 Congress
charged the General Services Administration (GSA) with
administering FACA, granting it authority to develop and
apply guidelines and controls to improve the performance of
advisory committees."
To both monitor and limit the growing number of
federal advisory committees, FACA requires that each such
committee be established by charter for a term limited to two
years, renewable for two-year periods only with proper
justification. 9 Upon establishment, timely notice must be
published in the Federal Register, to serve the "public
interest."" Moreover, no meetings may be held or action taken
by an advisory committee without such public notice.'
Meetings must be open to the public, except when the
President determines otherwise for reasons of national
security." Notice of meetings must be published in the Federal
25 An advisory committee may be differentiated from an agency in that an
advisory committee exists to advise and not to decide. See infra text accompanying note
177.
26 5 U.S.C. app. § 3 (definitions).
27 5 U.S.C. app. § 5 (responsibilities of congressional committees; review;
guidelines).
28 5 U.S.C. app. § 7 (responsibilities of the Administrator of General Services;
Committee Management Secretariat, establishment; review; recommendations to
President and Congress; agency cooperation; performance guidelines; uniform pay
guidelines; travel expenses; expense recommendations).
29 5 U.S.C. app. § 9 (establishment and purpose of advisory committees;
publication in Federal Register; charter; filing contents and copy).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 5 U.S.C. app. § 10 (advisory committee procedures; meetings; notice;
[Vol. 69: 1
2003] DRAWING THE CURTAIN ON OPEN GOVERNMENT 351
Register, so that interested members of the public can attend,
subject to discretionary exemptions33 that allow closed meetings
in limited circumstances. Records of the advisory committee,
including membership records, meeting attendance records,
detailed minutes of meetings, matters discussed and
conclusions reached, and any reports prepared or received,
must be publicly available, subject to nine potential exemptions
under FOIA.34 The FOIA exemptions include information
specifically exempted by executive order for reasons of national
security, internal agency rules, statutory exemptions,
confidential trade and financial information, pre-decisional
inter and intra-agency memoranda, personnel information, law
enforcement information, financial institution records, and oil
well data.35 In sum, Congress, reacting to public concern about
government accountability and special interest influence,
intended FACA to reveal the often hidden workings of
executive policy making. Operating through numerous
disclosure mechanisms that applied to most advisory
committees, FACA formalized the mechanism for greater
public scrutiny of the executive branch - a crucial safeguard in
a modern, increasingly administrative state. Whether and to
publication in Federal Register; regulations; minutes; certification; annual report;
federal officer or employee attendance).
33 FACA states that:
[s]ubsections (a)(1) and (a)(3) of this section shall not apply to any portion of
an advisory committee meeting where the President, or the head of the
agency to which the advisory committee reports, determines that such
portion of such meeting may be closed to the public in accordance with
subsection (c) of section 552b of title 5, United States Code. Any such
determination shall be in writing and shall contain the reasons for such
determination. If such a determination is made, the advisory committee shall
issue a report at least annually setting forth a summary of its activities and
such related matters as would be informative to the public consistent with
the policy of section 552(b) of title 5, United States Code.
5 U.S.C. app. § 10(d).
FACA further states that:
[slubject to section 552 of title 5, United States Code, the records, reports,
transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or
other documents which were made available to or prepared for or by each
advisory committee shall be available for public inspection and copying at a
single location in the offices of the advisory committee or the agency to which
the advisory committee reports until the advisory committee ceases to exist.
5 U.S.C. app. § 10(b).
Referenced FOIA exemptions to document requests under FACA apply
only when such privilege is asserted by the advisory committee; otherwise, documents
are obtainable under FACA without a separate FOIA claim.
35 Id. See also Bonnie Lewis Gay, Litigator's Guide to Using Government
Source and Freedom of Information Act, BRIEF (A.B.A.), Fall 1985, at 52.
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what extent that promise can be fulfilled within constitutional
parameters, however, remains up to the courts.
B. Case Law
1. Supreme Court Guidance on Executive Privilege and
Separation of Powers
The Constitution says nothing about the rights of
Congress, the courts, or the public to access the President's
communications. Nor does it speak to the President's right to
refuse such access. 6  Nonetheless, when applied to the
confidential communications of a President or presidential
advisors, FACA raises "formidable" issues of constitutionality."
It can potentially disrupt Article II duties," thus provoking the
claim of executive privilege,39 and may overstep the separation
of powers. The Supreme Court has provided ample guidance for
resolution of these questions. Rather than applying a formalist
rule based on rigid separation between government branches,
the Court has utilized a functional approach, employing a
balancing test" that weighs the potential disruption of a
President's constitutional duties against competing
constitutional interests.' This test rests on the principle that
36 Cox, supra note 13, at 1384. Note, however, case law support for such
rights of access under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the
Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative
State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
37 Public Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989) [hereinafter
Public Citizen].
38 Impairment of the President's ability to receive frank advice may disrupt
the President's Article II duty to develop and recommend legislative policy to Congress.
'9 Cox, supra note 13, at 1383 (stating that "[oiccasionally, presidents
asserted a right to withhold information either for themselves or on behalf of their
subordinates, and the claim came to be known as 'executive privilege'").
40 See Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A
Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 718 (1990) (quoting Nixon I.
418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) ("Because 'airtight' separation of powers is not what the
Constitution requires, the validity of any intrusion by one branch into the prerogatives
of another is to be measured by a functional standard rather than a formal rule.")).
, Nixon II, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). But see
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 486 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment, dissenting in
part) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) as an example of the Court's rejection
of use of a balancing test in a separation of powers challenge to the legislative veto
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act). Justice Kennedy wrote that "[olur
decision in Chadha might also be read for the more general principle that where an
enactment transgresses the explicit distribution of power in the text of the
Constitution, then regardless if whether it implicates the Legislative, the Judicial, or
the Executive power, a balancing inquiry is not appropriate." Id. at 486 n.5. FACA,
however, does not present an issue of transgression of a specific power granted in the
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the three coequal branches "were not intended to operate with
absolute independence. "2 The Court has repeatedly stressed
that interdependence" between the branches underpins our
governmental system and as such, becomes the starting point
from which to judge "inevitable"' conflicts along the borders of
power. The Court applied its test to claims of executive
privilege in United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), ° and to separation
of powers issues in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services
(Nixon II),"' and Morrison v. Olson.7
Executive privilege is a qualified privilege that allows a
President to refuse to disclose his communications to Congress
or the public."8 While the Constitution makes no explicit
reference to a presidential privilege of confidentiality, the
Court in Nixon IP9 nonetheless recognized its implicit
constitutional basis. The subject of Nixon I was the infamous
text of the Constitution.
42 Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 707. See also Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc.
v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 906-11 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter AAPS] (discussing flaws
of a bright-line argument against FACA's application). But see Morrison, 487 U.S. at
711 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing against the majority's balancing test and in favor
of a "clear constitutional prescription that the executive power belongs to the
President"); Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 484-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing along
with two other Justices for a bright-line rule; the majority interpreted FACA so as to
avoid addressing the constitutional question).
4 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity.").
" Cox, supra note 13, at 1419 n.141 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[T]he doctrine of separation of powers
was adopted . . .not to promote efficiency, but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to
save the people from autocracy.")).
45 418 U.S. at 707.
46 433 U.S. 425. See also Morrison, 487 U.S. 654.
47 487 U.S. 654.
48 Though some form of privilege has been asserted since the days of
Washington's presidency, the term "executive privilege" first surfaced during the
Eisenhower administration. President Eisenhower said:
There is no business that could be run if there would be exposed every single
thought that an adviser might have, because in the process of reaching an
agreed position, there are many, many conflicting opinions to be brought
together. And if any commander is going to get the free, unprejudiced
opinions of his subordinates, he had better protect what they have to say to
him on a confidential basis.
Cox, supra note 13, at 1386 (quoting Dwight D. Eisenhower).
48 418 U.S. at 705.
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Watergate break-in."° The Court unanimously ruled that
President Nixon's claim of executive privilege to withhold
confidential tape recordings he made in the Oval Office grew
from the President's Article II powers.5 ' However, the Court
made clear that the privilege was not absolute, and had to give
way when the interest of justice demanded." In this case, a
subpoena for the tapes for use as evidence in a criminal trial
trumped Nixon's privilege claim."
Though President Nixon lost this particular battle, the
decision was significant for future administrations. For the
first time, the Court officially recognized the need for frank and
open discussion between a President and his advisors.'
Describing the potential chilling effect on presidential advisors'
speech, the Court found that:
The valid need for protection of communications between high
[g]overnment officials . . .is too plain to require further discussion.
Human experience teaches that those who expect public
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a
concern of appearance and for their own interests to the detriment of
the decision making process."
Nevertheless, despite this chilling effect,5 the Court
found this to be a situation where countervailing interests
rebutted the presumption of executive privilege. 7 To hold
otherwise "would upset the constitutional balance of a
'workable government' and would gravely impair the power of
the courts under Art. III.""
Within the specific context of criminal prosecutions, the
Court minimized disclosure's chilling effect: "[Wie cannot
conclude that advisers will be moved to temper the candor of
their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because
of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in
50 Id. See supra note 14.
"' Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 706-07.
52 Id.
13 Id. at 712.
Id. at 705.
55 Id.
The actuality of a chilling effect is both untested, and probably un-testable.
It is reasonable to presume that in many cases, the advice given by a private party
would be consistent whether or not disclosure was required. For example, it is
reasonable to expect a CEO in the oil industry who publicly advocates drilling in the
Artic National Wildlife Refuge to privately advise the executive branch to support such
drilling in its policy recommendations to Congress.
57 Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 706.
58 Id. at 707.
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the context of a criminal prosecution."" Thus, Nixon's
"generalized claim" of privilege based on the public interest in
presidential confidentiality was outweighed by the specific
need to obtain the subpoenaed information. The Court further
noted that Nixon's claim did not involve the protection of
military or diplomatic communications," implying that such
areas of express Article II powers carried more weight than
broad assertions of privilege when weighing the relative
importance.
Before he resigned from office, Nixon also launched a
separation of powers challenge in an attempt to retain control
over those same tapes and other presidential documents,2
forming the basis of Nixon I. Congress had passed the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of
1974 (PRMPA)' to protect and preserve Nixon's tapes and
documents for national archival purposes and for review in the
interest of potential remedial legislative action. PRMPA gave
the government control over these materials enabling
screening and retention of any non-private material for the
public. Nixon challenged the constitutionality of the Act as a
violation of separation of powers. The Court rejected any
characterization of "airtight"' separation between the
branches, and thus rejected Nixon's argument as "inconsistent
with the origins of that doctrine, recent decisions of the Court,
and the contemporary realities of our political system." '
As in the context of executive privilege, the Court
articulated a balancing test to examine the potential disruption
to a President's execution of his Article II duties. "[T]he proper
inquiry focuses on the extent to which [the statute] prevents
59 Id. at 712.
60 Here, the President's challenge was not based on confidentiality in
communications related to military or foreign affairs, "areas of Art. II duties [towards
which] the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference." Id. at 710.
61 Id.
62 See supra note 14.
Nixon 11, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-526, 8 Stat. 1695 (1974) (current version at 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (2000)) (unlike
current version, original provisions specifically referred to Nixon by name). Note that
the Court found that PRMPA was not a bill of attainder, though it referred to President
Nixon by name, since its action did not constitute "punishment." Nixon II, 433 U.S. at
478. For further discussion, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 460 (2d ed. 2002).
Nixon 11, 433 U.S. at 443.
Id. at 441.
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the executive branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions."7 Here, the Court found "no reason to
believe that the restriction on public access' ultimately
established by regulation [through the screening process of
PRMPA] will not be adequate to preserve executive
confidentiality.""9 This holding reflected a balancing in favor of
the "substantial public interests" in preserving the non-private
presidential materials and restoring public confidence in
government.7° But the Court emphasized this was a narrow
holding, made necessary by the unusual nature of Nixon's
resignation in Watergate's aftermath."
The Court more recently reaffirmed its balancing test in
separation of powers cases in Morrison v. Olson.7" Morrison
concerned a constitutional challenge by the executive branch to
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978."3 Like PRMPA, Congress
passed the Ethics in Government Act in response to Watergate.
This Act authorized the Attorney General to recommend to a
special judicial panel the appointment of independent counsel
to investigate and prosecute high-level government officials for
violations of federal criminal law." The "independence" of the
independent counsel was central to the case: prosecution is a
"quintessentially executive activity,"" but from a functionalist
67 Id. at 426. But see id. at 508 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (conceding that the
coordinate branches were not "watertight", but opining that PRMPA constituted
.coercion" by Congress over the executive branch, violated separation of powers and
dramatically changed the historical course of presidential confidentiality). See also
Alfange, supra note 40, at 718.
The PRMPA screening process required the director of General Services to
take possession of the tapes and documents, and review them to determine which, if
any, were purely private materials that would then be returned to the President. Those
materials that the director determined were of a public nature were retained for public
access. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 350.
69 Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 450.
70 Id. at 453.
71 Id. at 483-84.
72 Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
73 Ethics in Government Act of 1978,
74 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (2000) (expiring in 1998 without renewal, thus
terminating the office of the Independent Counsel). Notably, this occurred in the
aftermath of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's extended investigation of President
Clinton, under circumstances foreshadowed by Justice Scalia in his dissent in
Morrison, 487 U.S at 706. See infra note 75. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at
338.
75 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (basing a clear-cut
separation of powers argument on the premise that the Constitution vests
prosecutorial authority exclusively in the executive branch). It is interesting to note
that Justice Scalia, in his dissent opposing appointment of the independent counsel on
separation of powers grounds, states that the primary check on the executive branch is
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perspective, investigations of executive branch officials
necessarily must be conducted outside the control of those
officials.
By a seven-to-one margin, the Court upheld the Act's
constitutionality on both textual and functional grounds. By
finding that an independent counsel is an "'inferior' officer in
the constitutional sense" 7 with limited scope of authority and
limited tenure, 8 the Court held that the Act neither violated
the Appointments clause"9 nor "impermissibly" interfered with
the President's Article II authority over prosecutions.
Referencing Nixon II, the Court found that the Act's
requirements did reduce the direct control of the Attorney
General over the activities of the independent counsel (thereby
reducing the President's control), but did not "disrupt the
proper balance between the coordinate branches [by]
prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions."' Again, in finding no
separation of powers violation, the Court recognized the
inherent overlap between the legislative and executive
branches and the need for judicial balancing to accommodate
competing interests. Thus, through its holdings in these three
challenges by the executive branch, the Court has laid the
constitutional groundwork necessary for resolution of FACA
challenges, via fact-intensive, case-by-case review.
a political one. He thus sets the ground for the need for FACA, since political checks
can only exist where information is available to the voting public.
71 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 340.
77 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672.
78 Id. at 671-2.
79 Id. at 658. The Appointments clause provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 2.
so Morrison, 487 U.S. at 658. Note also the outcome of Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681 (1997). Here, the Court set a rather high bar for disruption of a President's
ability to execute his Article II duties, holding that the "burden on the President's time
and energy that is a mere by-product of such review" was not enough to outweigh the
plaintiffs right in this case to proceed with her civil litigation. Id. at 705.
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2. FACA Cases
a. What Counts as an "Advisory Group"
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance instructs that
no constitutional question should be decided unless necessary
to resolving the case at hand; constitutional interpretation
should not be broader than the facts at issue." In Public Citizen
v. U.S. Department of Justice,"' the only Supreme Court FACA
case, the Court adhered to this doctrine to avert the
"formidable constitutional difficulties" it foresaw in disruption
of the President's ability to seek advice from private persons.'
The issue was whether FACA applied to executive branch
consultation with the American Bar Association (ABA) in the
judicial nomination process. Through review of the FACA's
history and interpretation, the majority read the definition of
"advisory group" to exclude the ABA, thus exempting the
group's meetings with the President from FACA's
requirements.
Because the President must "utilize" the advice of a
group for it to count as advisory, the Court's interpretation
depended upon severely limiting the meaning of the word
"utilized" in the statute, to arrive at the conclusion that the
President had not "utilized" the ABA when he consulted them
in consideration of judicial candidates.' Expressing concern
with the "unfettered breadth" of FACA's definition of advisory
group, the Court justified its seeming stretch in this instance
by postulating that absurd results would follow if the law
applied to any private organization which offered advice to the
President at his request.' Three justices, concurring in the
judgment but dissenting in part on the majority's rationale,'
would have held that FACA unconstitutionally interfered with
81 See infra text accompanying notes 150-52.
82 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
"" Id. at 466.
Id. at 452 (finding that -utilize' is a wooly verb" and not susceptible to
precise definition within the "contours left undefined" in FACA).
85 Id. at 452 n.8.
Justice Kennedy filed an opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, but dissenting in part as to application
of a balancing test in this instance, where FACA interfered directly with the
President's powers under the Appointments Clause. Id. at 486-88. Justice Scalia took
no part in the determination of the case. Id.
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the President's Article II appointment power 7 and also violated
the separation of powers.'
Echoing the general constitutional concerns of Public
Citizen, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found in Association
of American Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton (AAPS) 9 that the
Act's definition of advisory group did not apply to a 1993 health
care task force led by the sitting President's wife, Hillary
Clinton. A challenge ensued, with plaintiffs claiming that the
first lady's status as a private citizen meant FACA
requirements applied to the task force and had been violated.
Following the lead of the Supreme Court's statutory
analysis in Public Citizen, the circuit court in AAPS stretched
the definition of government "employee" to include the
President's wife, thus ensuring that the advisory group she led
was wholly composed of government officials and employees
and thus not subject to FACA disclosure.' As had the Supreme
Court before it, the circuit court thus avoided ruling whether
the Act impacts a President's ability to seek advice directly
from private citizens." Despite ruling against FACA's
application in this instance, the court raised the issue of "de
facto" membership, recognizing that distinctions between
formally recognized members and private consultants could be
rather murky, 2 and were open to government manipulation."
87 Id. at 482. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 338-40.
m Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 486-89.
89 AAPS, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
90 Id. See supra text accompanying note 26.
9' AAPS, 997 F.2d at 910.
92 Id. at 915. Specifically, the court found the "key issue" to be:
not whether these consultants are "full-time" government employees under
section 3(2), but whether they can be considered members of the working
group at all. When an advisory committee of wholly government officials
brings in a "consultant" for a one-time meeting, FACA is not triggered
because the consultant is not really a member of the advisory committee ....
We are confident that Congress did not intend FACA to extend to episodic
meetings between government officials and a consultant. To do so would
achieve the absurd result Public Citizen warned against: reading FACA to
cover every instance when the President (or an agency) informally seeks
advice from two or more private citizens.
But a consultant may still be properly described as a member of an
advisory committee if his involvement and role are functionally
indistinguishable from those of the other members. Whether they exercise any
supervisory or decisionmaking authority is irrelevant. If a "consultant"
regularly attends and fully participates in working group meetings as if he
were a "member," he should be regarded as a member. Then his status as a
private citizen would disqualify the working group from the section 3(2)
exemption for meetings of full-time government officials.
Id. (emphasis added).
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In its opinion in In re Sealed Case, another FACA
challenge, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals suggested it would
extend constitutional protection beyond direct communications
with the President to that of his direct advisors." Yet the court
also warned that such a narrowing of FACA's scope could
"sequester" too much from public view:
[Olpenness in government has always been thought crucial to
ensuring that the people remain in control of their government....
The very reason that presidential communications deserve special
protection, namely the President's unique powers and profound
responsibilities, is simultaneously the very reason why securing as
much public knowledge of presidential actions as is consistent with
the needs of governing is of paramount importance.95
For these reasons, the In re Sealed Case court limited
its own holding to the circumstances of the case at hand, out of
concern for undercutting FACA's central purpose.' It therefore
remains unknown whether FACA can constitutionally require
close presidential advisors to reveal the nature or sources of
their own deliberations when such advice is ultimately
intended for the benefit of the President.
In addition to the above cases, further statutory
interpretation by the courts and by the GSA under its
regulatory authority has clarified the definition of advisory
committee under FACA. The courts and the GSA agree on the
fundaments of this definition: An advisory committee exists or
is utilized for a specific purpose, namely to give advice to the
President or officials or employees of government; via a
formally organized group; with fixed membership including at
least one non-government member. Ad hoc meetings to check
the pulse of the public fall outside this definition," as do
93 Id. (noting that, through limitations on the form of advisory groups under
FACA requirements, the government exercises "a good deal of control over whether a
group constitutes a FACA advisory committee").
94 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
95 Id. at 749, cited in Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 52 (D.D.C. 2002).
96 Id. at 753 ("Our determination of how far down into the executive branch
the presidential communications privilege goes is limited to the context before us ...
we take no position on how the institutional needs of Congress and the President
should be balanced"), cited in Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
97 AAPS, 997 F.2d at 915; see also Croley & Funk, supra note 18, at 473
(identifying these three core components of the definition of advisory committee under
FACA).
98 Nader v. Baroody, 396 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that
biweekly meetings were an informal exchange of views, "amorphous" in form, and
without the specific purpose of providing advice).
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informal meetings where advice is not specifically sought,"
though a single formal meeting could qualify."u Because advice,
and not factual information, is FACA's concern, the
communications of groups that are primarily operational
rather than advisory fall outside the statute. 1 In contrast,
policy advice falls squarely within the target of FACA,
especially when the executive branch specifically seeks the
advice from a group mandated to provide it, and considers no
alternative source for the advice."2
b. What Constitutes Sufficient
Balance of an Advisory Group
FACA requires that advisory committees have balanced
membership to ensure diversity in represented viewpoints and
to avoid capture by special interests. Notably, however, the Act
omits a standard by which a court could evaluate compliance
with this term. 3 Some courts have looked to the function of the
advisory committee to determine whether the group is
sufficiently diverse." At least one court found that the
9 Id.
'00 See Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Califano, 603 F.2d 327 (2d. Cir. 1979)
(finding the group here met the FACA's definition of advisory committee though just
one meeting was held, since future reliance on the group was also possible).
'o' Cal. Forestry Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 102 F.3d 609 (D.D.C.
1996) (finding group was advisory in purpose, thus FACA was applicable); Northwest
Forest Res. Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding group was
advisory in purpose, thus FACA was applicable); Judicial Watch v. Clinton, 76 F.3d
1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding legal defense team was operational, not advisory, thus
FACA does not apply); Nat'l Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 806 F. Supp. 275 (D.D.C.
1992) (finding actions of group were operational, not advisory, thus FACA does not
apply).
1o2 See Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009 (D.D.C.
1994) (finding group's mandate was to develop policy options and the administration
considered no other source for advice); Food Chem. News v. Davis, 378 F. Supp 1048
(D.D.C. 1974) (holding FACA applicable though only two informal meetings took place,
supported by the fact that the agency had specifically formed the group to provide
policy advice regarding liquor labeling); Nader, 396 F. Supp. at 1234 (ruling the FACA
not applicable since the group here was not called together to render specific policy
advice); Judicial Watch v. Clinton, 76 F.3d 1232 (finding advice rendered by legal
defense team was for private purposes, not policy driven, thus FACA does not apply).
"'3 See supra note 27. See also Sanchez v. Pena, 17 F. Supp. 2d. 1235 (D.N.M.
1998).
'4 Public Citizen v. Nat'l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for
Foods, 708 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding upon review of the function of the
advisory committee that it required highly technical membership with expertise in
science and food processing); Cargill v. United States, 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999)
(finding adequate balance in the advisory committee since its function was technical
and not political).
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chartering agency's own balance requirements supplied
workable standards. ' However, other courts have held the
absence of standards in FACA's text renders the term
injusticiable.'"
c. Remedies
Similarly, FACA omits any remedial provision, thus
leaving the courts to fashion appropriate relief."°7 Courts widely
diverge on whether relief should be granted at all, and if so, on
the nature of that relief. Plaintiffs may seek declaratory
judgment to clarify their rights to access meetings and
information, but such relief cannot remedy retrospective harm
caused by violations.' Injunction may thus be appropriate, for
.05 Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 938 F. Supp. 52 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding the
sponsoring agency's own charter provided the law to apply in its requirement that
three individuals from private industry were part of the advisory committee).
'06 Sanchez, 17 F. Supp. 2d. 1235 (finding the question of balance
unjusticiable given the absence of statutory guidance and the political nature of the
question). But see Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Califano, 603 F.2d 327, 334 (2d. Cir.
1979) (finding the balance requirement applicable to the agency creating the advisory
committee to assure against inappropriate influence by special interests).
107 Though the statutory language of FACA omits provisions for private
remedy, violation of FACA's terms represents "sufficiently distinct injury to provide
standing to sue", Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 441, thus enabling a claim that such
violation was "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA). The APA governs agency procedures, including the open meeting and public
information requirements of FACA and FOIA. APA regulations seek to ensure
uniformity, thus applying equally to all agencies, regardless of form or function. See
discussion infra Part II.C.2.
100 Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n, 603 F.2d at 336 (discussing declaratory
judgment as proper relief, though its grant is discretionary with the district court).
Here, the court upheld the district court's refusal to grant relief, stating:
The question of remedy remains. So far as we are aware, no court has held
that a violation of FACA would invalidate a regulation adopted under
otherwise appropriate procedures, simply because it stemmed from the
advisory committee's recommendations, or even that pending rulemaking
must be aborted and a fresh start made. We perceive no sound basis for doing
so. Applicable rulemaking procedures afford ample opportunity to correct
infirmities resulting from improper advisory committee action prior to the
proposal.
Id.
But see Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Dept. of Interior, 26 F.3d
1103, 1107 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting the inadequacy of declaratory judgment as a form
of relief since it does nothing to address plaintiffs injury nor induce future compliance
with the FACA). This court found "injunctive relief as the only vehicle that carries the
sufficient remedial effect to ensure future compliance with FACA's clear requirements.
Anything less would be tantamount to nothing." Id. (emphasis added). However, it also
recognized:
that other Circuits have affirmed the denial of injunctive relief requested as a
result of FACA violations. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. National Advisory
Committee, 281 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 886 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1989); National
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example, to force compliance with FACA's notice.9 or open
meeting terms... when an advisory group is still under charter,
or to obtain access to documents when its charter has expired.
Citing the important purpose of FACA in opening the activities
of the government to the people, the inadequacy of other relief,
and the fact that unchecked non-compliance renders the Act a
"nullity," some courts have employed a most stringent remedy:
enjoining the government from using the work product of its
advisory group."' By contrast, other courts have found such
relief excessive due to taxpayer expense in producing the work
product, and the perceived harmlessness of a mere regulatory
violation."' Clearly, differing factual circumstances have
dictated very different outcomes across FACA cases, as would
be expected under a case-by-case balancing approach. Still, the
relative success of the Act remains vulnerable to the actions of
the executive branch in terms of the level of support offered, or
withheld, in promoting and enforcing its requirements.
C. Executive Branch Receptiveness to FACA
Receptiveness to FACA's underlying open government
principles varies with successive administrations. While there
appears to be general compliance and agreement on FACA's
value at the agency level, where career civil servants hold
sway,"' Presidents have displayed different attitudes toward
Nutritional Foods Ass'n. v. Califano, 603 F.2d 327 (2nd Cir. 1979). However,
neither Circuit held that injunctive relief was a categorically unavailable
remedy for a FACA violation. Rather, the consideration of the possibility of
injunctive relief suggests that those courts found no express or implied
prohibition of this remedy. They merely found that on the individual facts of
the cases before them, injunctive relief was inappropriate. We have different
facts before us and, accordingly, reach a different result.
Id. at 1107 n.8.
'09 See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
"o See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
In Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition, 26 F.3d at 1106 (enjoining the use of
prepared report of advisory group which violated FACA to induce compliance and citing
with approval the district court's opinion that a simple "excuse me" after the fact was
insufficient in light of the important purpose of the Act). See also Cal. Forestry Ass'n,
102 F.3d 609 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that injunction against use of advisory group's
work product could be an appropriate remedy on remand).
112 Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009 (D.D.C.
1994) (holding relief of injunction excessive, though group was found to have violated
the FACA).
13 Croley & Funk, supra note 18, at 538 (providing survey results and
anecdotal support from agency respondents indicating widespread compliance and
agreement with principles of the FACA). It is important to recognize that these results
may represent a Clinton-era attitude. However, most respondents were career civil
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the general principles of openness as applied to executive
communications. Presidents Ford, Carter, and Clinton all
verbalized a commitment to "open government" while still
reserving their executive privilege, though among them, only
President Clinton actually asserted that privilege."' In
contrast, Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush were more
protective of executive secrecy, though they chose methods
other than executive privilege to work around information
requests."' The current administration of George W. Bush has
taken a hard line, seeking to protect not only his own
communications, but also those of previous President's
administrations."'
Presidents have resisted revealing confidential
communications right up to the point where response from
Congress, the media, and public interest groups suggested the
costs in political capital and public opinion overrode any
interest in protecting presidential secrecy. History contains
many instances of the President and executive officers
ultimately bowing to political pressure and revealing
communications to overcome a negative public perception
brought on by noncompliance."' For example, President Reagan
dropped an assertion of privilege when contempt charges were
brought against Interior Secretary James Watt in a high-
profile national land use case."8  Similarly, during the
Whitewater investigations, President Clinton backed down
from a threatened use of privilege after extremely negative
characterizations in the press."'
Sometimes, however, Presidents have been able to avoid
negative impact while withholding information sought under
the open government statutes. For example, the first Bush
servants, thus their attitudes towards the FACA may transcend administration
changes and remain a valid generalization.
114 Matthew Cooper Weiner, Note, In the Wake of Whitewater: Executive
Privilege and the Institutionalized Conflict Element of Separation of Powers, 12 J.L. &
POL. 775, 801-02 (1996).
5 Id. at 802-05 (referencing Reagan's political deal-making and the George
H.W. Bush administration's "deft handling" in avoiding compliance to requests to turn
over the Reagan diaries).
"6 Pam M. Holt, Steady the Privilege Pendulum, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Apr. 4, 2002, at 13 (discussing George W. Bush's protection of his administration's
communications regarding the national energy policy and homeland security, as well
extension of protection for his father's papers, which may include details of Iran-Contra
activities, and sought-after Clinton-era papers).
"7 Weiner, supra note 114, at 795-803.
"' Id. at 802-03.
"9 Id. at 806.
[Vol. 69: 1
2003] DRAWING THE CURTAIN ON OPEN GOVERNMENT 365
administration, without asserting privilege, used tactics to stall
the media as it sought information on the Desert Storm
operations of the Gulf War. When Congresswoman Barbara
Boxer picked up the inquiry, the administration first delayed
initial court proceedings, only later raising the issue of
executive privilege. ' Ultimately, it released the information,
but "too late to play a role in Congress' decision-making
process..' ...
Presidents may also leverage their attitudes towards
open government for political ends. Soon after taking office,
President Clinton called on all federal departments to renew
their commitment to open government principles as he
attempted to streamline agency operations and increase public
accountability.' In contrast, in the interest of national security
post the September 11 terrorist attacks, the George W. Bush
administration increased government secrecy, with apparent
public approval.23 For example, under the direction of Attorney
General John Ashcroft, records detailing energy facility
specifications, previously available, have been removed from
general public purview under FOIA, though access may still be
available through a more regulated process.'24  Such
management of public opinion through varying receptiveness to
FACA principles is part of the political process. Still, regardless
of whether the executive branch voices support for FACA,
media and public pressure historically has tended to induce
compliance with it and the other open government statutes.
120 Id. at 805.
121 Id.
121 See Exec. Order No. 12,838, 58 Fed. Reg. 8207 (Feb. 10, 1993) (Termination
and Limitation of Federal Advisory Committees); Clinton Mem., Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, 1993 Presidential Documents Online via GPO Access,
available at http://frwais.access.gpo.gov (October 4, 1993), cited in Dept. of Energy,
Notice of Conference on Freedom of Information Act Policies and Procedures, 61 Fed.
Reg. 14766 (April 3, 1996) (calling on all Federal departments and agencies to renew
their commitment to the underlying principles and sound administration of the FOIA).
123 I am assuming general approval, given President Bush's continued high
ratings in public opinion polls. Note, for example, Newsweek's poll of public
approval/disapproval of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as President: The
President enjoyed consistently high results, particularly since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Polling Report.com, President Bush: Job Ratings, at
http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2003). These results
are reflected in similar polls by ABC News/Washington Post, CBS News, Fox News,
and others. Id.
124 Department of Energy, Federal Regulatory Commission, Proposed Rules,
67 Fed. Reg. 3129 (Jan. 16, 2002).
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Considering that compliance with FACA is
nondiscretionary, challenges have been relatively few. Existing
case law has helped fill gaps in the Act, creating an adequate
framework for adjudication in most circumstances. When
constitutional issues have arisen with regard to FACA,
however, the judiciary has yet to tackle the difficult task of
determining just how much information should be sequestered
from public view upon application of the balancing test put
forward in Nixon II and Morrison.
III. A CURRENT FACA CASE: JUDICIAL WATCH V. NEPDG
Judicial Watch, a FACA challenge to a group advising
the President on national energy policy, forges into uncharted
territory in terms of the constitutional issues raised by
application of the Act to close presidential advisors.
A. Background
In a January 29, 2001 memorandum, President George
W. Bush established the National Energy Policy Development
Group.' 5 The memorandum directed NEPDG members to
gather information, deliberate, and make policy
recommendations to the President to help the private sector
and the government promote "dependable, affordable, and
environmentally sound production and distribution of
energy."' NEPDG ultimately delivered its recommendations to
the President within its charter period, and the National
Energy Plan was released in May of 2001.27 The NEPDG
expired upon termination of its charter.
The National Energy Plan includes 105 specific
recommendations.' Though forty-two of these
Bush Mem. Establishing Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, Jan. 29, 2001.
See Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2002). See also Public Papers of the
President, George Bush - 2001, U.S. Gov't Printing Office via GPO Access, Vol. 1, at
30, available at httpJ/www.gpo.access.gov/executive.html#presidential (Jan. 29, 2001).
' Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, National Energy Policy: Reliable,
Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future, available at
www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf (May 16, 2001).
127 Id.
128 Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy
Choices, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 346-49 (2002). As of August 20, 2003, according to
administration officials, 90 of the 105 proposals from the National Energy Policy were
put into effect. Elisabeth Bumiller & Jeff Gerth, Legislation: Ambitious Bush Plan is
Undone by Energy Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2003, at A16.
[Vol. 69: 1
2003] DRAWING THE CURTAIN ON OPEN GOVERNMENT 367
recommendations deal with energy conservation, the plan
clearly emphasizes continued reliance on traditional energy
sources.1 21 It focuses on increasing supplies of energy primarily
by promoting policies favorable to the petroleum industry, such
as drilling on federal lands, including the Arctic Wildlife
Refuge."' The plan also calls for increasing the use and supply
of nuclear power through tax incentives for new nuclear
facilities and through expedited license processing.'
Additionally, the plan benefits the coal industry through a
rollback of emissions standards, 2 which would allow existing
coal plants to expand without meeting the more stringent clean
air standards required of new plants.'3 The plan supports its
objectives via a general "streamlining" of the regulatory
processes of the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the
National Environmental Policy Act.'
As a result of concern over improper influence by the
energy industry on the development of the National Energy
Policy,"' the conservative watchdog group Judicial Watch'36
12 Bryner, supra note 128, at 346.
130 Id. at 347.
3' Id. at 348.
"12 Id. at 377.
133 The coal industry provisions amount to a rewriting of "New Source Review,
which historically has required aging coal-fired power plants, oil refineries and
factories to install modern pollution-control equipment when they expand or upgrade."
Erin Kelly, Clean Air Changes Opposed; Leahy, Jeffords Express Dismay over Power
Plant Rules, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Jan. 17, 2003, at 2A. The new regulations were
announced December 2002, as the new Congress opened, and were immediately
challenged by a number of Northeastern states, including New York, New Jersey, and
Vermont, which claim they are adversely affected by emissions from the primarily
Southern coal plants. Id. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont indicated that the current
Bush administration "engaged in a pattern of rolling back clean air, clean water and
wilderness protection laws Friday afternoons or right before holidays when lawmakers
are generally out of town and the public isn't paying much attention." Id.
13 The impact on the Clean Air Act of the coal industry provision of the
National Energy Plan is one example of how the administration seeks to eliminate
what it views as over-burdensome regulatory obstacles. Another example is the Bush
administration's emergency forest treatment program, its "Healthy Forests" initiative,
which provides for an end-run around the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
by placing areas of national forest under "emergency" status due to the risk of fire. See
Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Undermining the U.S. National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), N.Y. L.J., Oct. 25, 2002, at 3, 7. The designated treatment is then
carried out - mature trees are logged by the private timber industry without the delay
necessitated by following the normal regulatory procedures under NEPA. Id.
135 The exceptional secrecy surrounding the development of the National
Energy Policy coupled with the steadfast refusal by the Bush administration to reveal
its sources suggests to its critics, perhaps unfairly, that the administration has
something to hide regarding its sources of policy advice. Still, the question of whether
special interest was "holding the pen" for government is not unreasonable based on the
nature of the pro-industry recommendations in the report, and the close ties that exist
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brought claims under FACA and FOIA, seeking information on
the nature, subject matter and attendance of NEPDG
meetings.'37 The Judicial Watch case names as defendants the
NEPDG, individual members of the federal government, and
private individuals believed to be members of the NEPDG.'38
Vice President Richard Cheney headed the NEPDG. The
government initially refused to name other members of the
between the President, Vice President, and top officials in the administration and the
energy industry. For example, the President was a board member of Harken Oil and
Gas, the Vice President was CEO of Halliburton, an energy services company, and the
Secretary of the Army was an Enron executive. See George Lardner Jr. & Lois Romano,
Bush Name Helps Fuel Oil Dealings, WASH. POST, July 30, 1999, at Al; Press Release,
Halliburton, Dick Cheney Resumes Role as Chairman of Halliburton Company (Feb. 1,
2000); Press Release, Halliburton, Lesar to Succeed Cheney as Halliburton Chairman
and CEO (July 25, 2000); Frank Pellegrini, For Enron, Washington May Have Been a
Bad Investment, TIME ONLINE-EDITION, at http://www.time.com/nation/
article/0,8599,193907,00.html (Jan. 15, 2002). See also MINORITY STAFF, SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 107TH CONG., REPORT ON BUSH ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS WITH
ENRON (May 2002).
Additionally, since 1999, U.S. campaign contributions from the oil and gas
industry have totaled $42,621,517, according to the nonpartisan Center for Responsive
Politics. See Justin Gerdes, Big Oil Still Lubes U.S. Energy Policy, KNIGHT-RIDDER
TRIBUNE BUSINESS NEWS: ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS, Apr. 5, 2002. From the limited
records thus far released as a result of a successful FOIA suit by the National
Resources Defense Council against the NEPDG, it is known that NEPDG member
Spencer Abraham alone "met with more than 100 representatives of energy industry
companies" from January to May 2001. Danielle Knight, Documents Show Bush Energy
Plan Fuelled by Industry, Politics-US, Inter Press Service, Global Information
Network, Mar. 27, 2002. Taken together, the energy business interests Abraham met
with (while the NEPDG was under charter) contributed in excess of $16 million to the
Republican Party since 1999. Id. Such a large sum of money from a single interest
group invariably raises the specter of improper influence over policy making.
116 Judicial Watch describes itself as "the public interest law firm that
investigates and prosecutes government corruption." Court Considers Discovery in
Cheney Energy Task Force Case, at http://www.judicialwatch.orgt1367.shtml (last
visited June 29, 2003) (quoting Judicial Watch press release).
,' Plaintiff Judicial Watch filed suit on July 16, 2001. Related claims under
FOIA were filed in the D.C. District Court by both Judicial Watch and the National
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) against the Department of Energy and Department
of Justice. See Judicial Watch v. United States Dep't of Energy, No. 01-0981, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3572, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2002); Natural Res. Def. Council v. United
States Dep't of Energy, 191 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2002). An order issued in the latter
suit, resulting in the production of some, but not all, sought-after documents, though
these were heavily redacted; continuing claims have been consolidated and NRDC is
pursuing a contempt complaint against the Department of Justice. See Dana Milbank,
Presidential Order Followed Draft by Lobbyists, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2002, at A26.
Also, an unprecedented suit by the General Accounting Office (GAO) was
filed in the D.C. District Court against Vice President Cheney, though on different
grounds, as Congress sought essentially the same information as Judicial Watch, the
NRDC and the Sierra Club. Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d. 51 (D.D.C. 2002). The
GAO claims, since dismissed, were brought under its financial oversight authority over
federal agencies and on specific federal laws regarding energy policy development.
" Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2002).
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group, but later alleged that all members were government
officials or employees.'39 If true, this would exempt the NEPDG
from claims under FACA, since FACA only applies to advisory
groups containing at least one non-government member.
Contradicting the government's position, Judicial Watch
alleged that the NEPDG did indeed have non-government
members, including, among others named in its complaint:
Kenneth Lay, former Chairman of Enron; energy industry
lobbyist Mark Racicot, former governor of Montana; and Haley
Barbour, former head of the Republican National Committee. ' 9
In discovery, Judicial Watch sought specific information on
meeting attendance to show that the NEPDG included private
individuals as it alleged. Specifically, the attendance records
would reveal what "regular" attendance constituted for
purposes of the NEPDG, and whether any private person in
fact attended meetings as regularly as the government
members. Moreover, even if there were no formally recognized
private members, AAPS held that the exemption from FACA
for an advisory committee entirely comprised of government
members did not apply when government committee members'
"involvement and roles are functionally indistinguishable from
those of other [private] members."''
On a motion for transfer by the government defendants,
the lawsuit was consolidated with a suit by the Sierra Club, an
environmental organization. In its suit against Vice President
Cheney and the NEPDG in the Northern District of
California,"' the Sierra Club was pursuing claims under FACA,
the APA,"3 and the federal mandamus statute."' Judicial Watch
139 The George W. Bush administration initially refused to name other
members of the NEPDG, but eventually claimed that the group was made up solely of
government officials and department heads, including among others: Colin Powell,
Secretary of State; Paul O'Neil, Secretary of the Treasury; Spencer Abraham, Secretary
of Energy; Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator of EPA; and Gail Norton, Secretary
of the Department of Interior. See Plaintiff Judicial Watch's Second Amended
Complaint at 5-7, Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. Action 01-
1530), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org1270.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
140 Plaintiff Judicial Watch's Second Amended Complaint at 8, Judicial
Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. Action 01-1530), available at
http://www.judicialwatch.org/1270.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
141 AAPS, 997 F.2d 898, 915 (1993) (discussing the possibility of de facto
membership for private individuals whose involvement with the advisory group was
virtually the same as government members). See discussion supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
142 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 23-24.
143 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and (D) (2000).
144 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000).
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was permitted to amend its original complaint, incorporating
claims raised by the Sierra Club under the APA and
mandamus statute."5 Judge Emmett G. Sullivan of the D.C.
District Court presided over the consolidated cases.
In a January 31, 2002 court order, Judge Sullivan found
the government's claim that "discovery would directly interfere
with the President's core constitutional power to obtain candid
and confidential advice from his closest advisers" to be
"conclusory" and ordered the government to detail specifically
"[in what way would allowing limited discovery . . .violate
Article II of the United States Constitution."'' The information
the plaintiffs sought under FACA included the number,
locations and times of meetings; what was discussed; and who
attended, including the number of private individuals in
attendance, and how many times any one individual attended
an NEPDG meeting.'47
B. The Government's Constitutional Claims
In a memorandum opinion issued July 11, 2002, Judge
Sullivan noted that the outcome of the related FOIA cases'
44
against the government could impact the statutory and
constitutional issues raised in the Judicial Watch case.'
4
Further, he stated that under the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance,'" it was inappropriate to rule on the constitutional
issues presented in light of the early stage of the proceedings."'
Thus, the court refused to "fashion a constitutional ruling
broader than the precise facts underlying this case," noting
,4 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
,16 Court Order of January 31, 2002, Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20
(D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. Action 01-1530), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/
1270.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
147 Id.
148 See supra text accompanying note 137 (discussing related FOIA cases).
149 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
150 Id. at 45 (quoting Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905) ("It is
not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.")).
"' Id. (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690 n.ll (1997), and Alabama
State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945) ("It has long been the
Court's considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions
... or to decide any constitutional question in advance of the necessity for its decision ...
or to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts
to which it is to be applied ... or to decide any constitutional question except with
reference to the particular facts to which it is to be applied.").
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that any constitutional inquiry in a future proceeding would
depend upon a "nuanced" development of the factual record."'
In strong language, Judge Sullivan chastised
government counsel for deliberately misrepresenting Supreme
Court precedent in the government's claim that FACA
interfered with the President's express constitutional authority
to receive confidential advice, whether from his advisors or
private individuals."' Government counsel based its flawed
"bright-line" separation of powers argument upon the
concurring, and not majority opinion of Public Citizen."4 Judge
Sullivan called the government's position "untenable," ' and
clarified that the proper inquiry turned upon the
interdependence, and not independence, of the coordinate
branches.' Calling "the implications of the bright-line rule
advocated by the government stunning," Judge Sullivan noted
that by extension, "such a ruling would eviscerate the
understanding of checks and balances on which our
constitutional order depends.""7
While passing on the constitutional issues, Judge
Sullivan carefully articulated what the fact-intensive
constitutional inquiry would entail when the case was properly
before the court." Per the Nixon H/Morrison balancing test,'59
the court would first determine whether FACA's application
(here, limited to access to NEPDG membership and meeting
records since publication and notice was already after the fact)
would prevent the President from fulfilling any of his
constitutionally assigned duties.'6 Only where the potential for
such disruption was present would the court then decide
152 Id.
"' Id. at 50 n.14.
'54 The Government conceded that the Supreme Court balancing test of Nixon
II/Morrison would apply in testing the FACA's constitutionality. Id. at 48 ("While
conceding that the Nixon/Morrison balancing test applies, the government urges this
court nonetheless to apply the bright-line rule embraced by the Public Citizen
concurrence.").
'55 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d. at 50.
5 Nixon H, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). But cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. 654, 705
(1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (writing that executive power "does not mean some of the
executive power, but all of the executive power").
157 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 50.
'15 The Judicial Watch case decided only preliminary issues of mootness,
standing, validity of claims, and whether discovery could proceed over the
Government's objections, in accordance with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 47-49, 55.
160 Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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whether any constitutionally authorized congressional purpose
justified the disruption."" The greater the intrusion into the
executive sphere, the greater the justification had to be.' 2
In this case, the government argued that "application of
FACA to the NEPDG encroaches on the sphere of the Executive
by infringing the President's right to receive the confidential
advice necessary to discharge his unique duties."" Judge
Sullivan articulated the question raised under FACA in this
case "as not whether the President's constitutionally protected
ability to receive advice in confidence was undermined, but
whether his advisors' ability to deliberate in confidence is
constitutionally protected, and how far down the line that
protection extends."' '  Here, Judge Sullivan noted, the
pleadings suggested that the only direct communication with
the President resulting from NEPDG deliberation was the
group's presentation to him of the final energy policy report,
which is in fact a public document."
Judge Sullivan observed that although the Supreme
Court has "repeatedly recognized . . .the importance to the
Presidency of receiving candid, honest, and when necessary,
unpopular, advice"" it has not yet ruled on the issue of how far
protection extends. The D.C. Circuit, however, had ruled: In re
Sealed Case extended constitutional protection beyond direct
communications between government executives and the
President.1 67 Despite the outcome of In re Sealed Case, Judge
Sullivan clarified that the D.C. Circuit limited its holding to
the facts of that case and warned of the risk of extending
161 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (citing Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 443 and
AAPS, 997 F.2d 898, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
,6-2 Id. at 45 ("[D]evelopment of the factual record will better enable this Court,
if ultimately faced with deciding whether it violates separation of powers to apply the
APA, FACA, or the federal mandamus statute in this context, with the information
necessary to properly apply the constitutional balancing test in the nuanced, fact-
intensive fashion required by precedent."). See also Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988);
Nixon 11, 433 U.S. 425; AAPS, 997 F.2d at 898.
'3 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
"4 Id. at 52. See also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(leaving open, in circumstances beyond those of the case at hand, the question of
whether executive privilege can be extended to include the communications of his chief
advisors).
'" Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
'6 Id. at 51-52 (citing Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974)).
,'7 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 749-51.
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constitutional protection too far and "sequestering" certain
information from public view."
Should the case progress to consideration of the
constitutional issues, according to Judge Sullivan, the Nixon
H/Morrison balancing test would consider the sum of FACA's
requirements in assessing the potential disruption to a
President's ability to carry out his constitutional duties."' The
Judge also noted that revealing the names of participants as
well as generated documents was likely a "less onerous" burden
than portrayed by the government, especially considering the
discretionary exemptions available within FACA."7 °
C. Plaintiffs' Claims under FACA, the APA, the Federal
Mandamus Statute, and FOIA
While withholding any ruling on the separation of
powers issues raised by the government, the court proceeded to
rule on the issues of mootness, potential remedies, and
standing, as they related to claims under FACA, the APA, the
federal mandamus statute, and FOIA. The court ultimately
dismissed the claims against the private defendants as outside
of the terms of the statute, retaining only the claims against
government entities and officials.
1. FACA Claims
The court held that claims of FACA violation were not
moot despite the termination of the NEPDG charter, since
methods of relief were still available. For example, the
plaintiffs could seek an injunction to obtain access to
documents that continued to exist, and/or a declaratory
judgment that the government violated the plaintiffs' rights
under FACA."7' Additionally, since Judicial Watch alleged in its
1 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 52 (citing In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d
729).
169 Id.
170 Id. at 53 (noting the available exemptions under FACA, including
information that is part of the deliberative process, national security concerns, and
ability to close meetings). The relative insignificance of the burden imposed was noted
by Amicus NRDC and referenced by Judge Sullivan. Id. For discussion of these
exemptions, see supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
171 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (citing Cummock v. Gore, 180 F.3d
282 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Though such a
remedy has precedential value, at least one court has determined that only injunctive
relief offers sufficient remedial effect for FACA violations. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers
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complaint that the NEPDG still existed, despite termination
under charter, a question of fact remained and thus all FACA
violations claimed by plaintiff Judicial Watch were potentially
viable. Despite this, and despite the number of prior suits by
private individuals under FACA, Judge Sullivan held that the
2001 Supreme Court ruling in Alexander v. Sandoval'"
required that further private action under FACA cease, since
the court could not read in a private right of action where
Congress had not explicitly provided for such a right in the text
of the statute."3 Thus, all direct FACA claims were dismissed.' 4
2. FACA Claims Brought Under the APA
In the alternative to bringing direct claims of FACA
violation, to enforce private rights granted under the Act, both
Judicial Watch plaintiffs claimed that the government's
violation of FACA was an "arbitrary and capricious" failure to
comply with the APA.' 5 That is, by violating the requirements
of FACA, the government failed in its performance of
nondiscretionary duty as required by the APA.'7' However,
FACA claims under the APA apply only to entities that meet
the statutory definition of "agency" and specifically, to "final
agency action" by these alleged agencies.'" Thus, this inquiry
opened questions of fact as to whether the government
defendants were agencies capable of final agency action.
Because plaintiff Sierra Club conceded that Vice
President Cheney was not an agency, the court dismissed the
APA claims against him and avoided facing the question of
whether a Vice President can ever be an agency under the
terms of the statute, a question also left unresolved by earlier
Coalition, 26 F.3d 1103, 1107 (11th Cir. 1994). See cases cited supra note 108.
' Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (holding that courts
may not read in a private cause of action where none is specifically authorized within
the text of a statute, even though that statute may explicitly create private rights). In
Judicial Watch, Judge Sullivan held that FACA is such a statute. Thus, though the
public was clearly designated rights under the statute, no express language created a
cause of action enabling a direct private challenge under FACA.
'13 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 33-34. Plaintiff Judicial Watch argued
that direct FACA claims were valid. Id. at 33. Plaintiff Sierra Club conceded that they
were not, thus brought no such claims. Id.
114 Id. at 34.
"5 Id. at 34-35.
176 Id. at 34.
,' Id. at 34-35, 40.
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cases. 7M The court also dismissed the APA claims against
NEPDG, since the Sierra Club conceded that the NEPDG no
longer existed, given its termination under charter. Because
Judicial Watch had fully adopted the Sierra Clubs concessions,
all APA claims against the Vice President and the NEPDG
were thus dismissed.'7M Accordingly, the court avoided deciding
whether the NEPDG or its subgroups were sufficiently
independent to qualify as agencies under APA regulations and
thus susceptible to claims of APA violation. However, because
defendant cabinet members and agency heads are agency
actors and can be sued under the APA, the court preserved the
claims against the remaining government defendants.
To make out valid claims under the APA, the plaintiffs
had to satisfy two predicates. First, they had to show that the
FACA violations embodied agency action, namely decisions by
the group. Second, they had to show that the violations were
final agency action, not merely a deliberative step toward some
final action." Regarding the agency action predicate, a
significant pitfall existed. If, later in the case, the court found
that Vice President Cheney, and not the collective or individual
members of the NEPDG, made the decisions, the claim would
178 Public Citizen vs. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (employing the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance to bypass the question of whether a Vice President
can be an agency); Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir 1993) (ruling that the APA
did not apply to the President, and alluding in dicta to its non-application to the Vice
President).
179 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 35. Specifically, the court held:
Because Sierra Club has conceded that the NEPDG no longer exists, any APA
claim brought directly against the NEPDG must be dismissed. Even though
Sierra Club's FACA claims with respect to the federal defendants are not
moot, if the NEPDG no longer exists, then it can not be sued as a defendant.
Thus, the Court need not resolve the question of whether the NEPDG or its
alleged sub-groups were sufficiently independent to qualify as an "agency" for
purposes of the APA.
Id.
In its amended complaint, Judicial Watch adopted the Sierra Club's
concessions with respect to the APA in their entirety, thus no claim of APA violation
against the Vice President or the NEPDG survived. Id. at 35 n.8.
' The Judicial Watch opinion cited the Supreme Court's definition of "final
agency action" from Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997):
As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be
'final': First, the action must mark the 'consummation' of the agency's
decisionmaking process, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) - it must not be of a merely tentative or
interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which 'rights or
obligations have been determined,' or from which 'legal consequences will
flow," Port of 'Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970).
Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
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fail since the Sierra Club had already conceded that the Vice
President was not an agency. Regarding the final action
requirement, the court determined that final agency action was
present by asking first, "whether the action (in closing NEPDG
meetings) was [the] consummation of the deliberative process
* . . not merely tentative or interlocutory action," and second,
whether rights and obligations had been determined from
which legal consequences would flow."' For example, by closing
the NEPDG meetings, the government had truncated plaintiffs'
rights to access under FACA, rendering the actions final for the
purposes of the APA. 1
2
The court also recognized that the establishment of
NEPDG subgroups by any of the individual agency heads who
were NEPDG members (such as the Secretary of Energy, the
Secretary of the Interior and the Administrator of the EPA)
created a valid claim under the APA for FACA violation."
Though these agency heads also served as advisors to the
President (potentially exempting them from FACA), actions by
any of them in establishing a subgroup could be ascribed to
their dual role as agency head for purposes of the APA.
Existing precedent, the court noted, had established that there
was "no basis for distinguishing between roles [of presidential
advisor or agency head] and thus no meaningful distinction
between the acts and responsibilities in one or the other role.""'
Thus, an agency head who established a subgroup without
authorization and approval would be liable for violation of
FACA claims under the APA."'
,81 Regarding final agency action, the court applied the two prong test of the
Supreme Court in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, to determine that final agency action
was present. Id. at 40.
'82 Id. According to the Judicial Watch opinion:
The decisions to hold meetings without public access to the meetings or the
records created indeed had a legal consequence - the denial of the public's
right of access to that information. Plaintiffs and other interested groups and
citizens were prevented from enforcing their right to access information that
exists pursuant to FACA. Subsequent actions taken without granting access,
and the failure to grant access itself, constitute final agency action.
Id.
183 Id. at 36-40. See discussion of formal NEPDG membership supra note 139.
'8 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
,.. Id. at 44.
What is clear from the statute is that some government official, whether it is
the Vice President or the NEPDG participants or someone else, has a duty
pursuant to FACA if the facts as alleged are proven. To whom that non-
discretionary duty falls is a question to be explored in discovery. At this stage
of the case, however, the Court need only acknowledge that FACA creates
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3. FACA Claims Brought Under the Federal Mandamus
Statute
The court held that the federal mandamus statute"'
could supply both jurisdiction and a cause of action where
"another federal statute imposes a non-discretionary duty on a
federal official and where no other relief is available."8 7 As
previously noted, FACA is such a statute, requiring agency
compliance with all of its terms if no exemptions apply. The use
of the mandamus statute, however, is within the discretion of
the district court asked to invoke it. Because it is "a drastic
remedy," a court cannot properly invoke mandamus unless it is
sufficiently free from doubt that there is no substantive or
jurisdictional alternative under the circumstances."8 Judge
Sullivan ruled that mandamus was available against all
government defendants, including the Vice President, to
compel the production of NEPDG documents, as per plaintiff
Sierra Club's claim, and for this and all FACA violations, as
per plaintiff Judicial Watch's claims (since Judicial Watch
contends that the NEPDG still exists). However, Judge
Sullivan held that separation of powers issues made the
invocation of mandamus premature at such an early stage of
the proceedings. 9 Thus, the court reserved decision on whether
a writ of mandamus should issue.
4. Claims Under FOIA
Finally, the court dismissed Judicial Watch's FOIA
claims, since Judicial Watch had made the error of asserting
them only against Vice President Cheney and not against the
NEPDG. The court noted that FOIA applied only to agencies
and, moreover, specifically not to agencies within the executive
office with the "sole function . . . to advise and assist the
[Plresident." 8' The court accepted the defendant's argument,
non-discretionary duties, and that, according to plaintiffs' allegations, one of
the defendants sued here could have violated those duties.
Id.
18 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000) ("Action to compel an officer of the United States to
perform his duty. The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the
nature of mandamus to an officer or an employee of the United States or an agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.")
187 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
'8 Id. at 41.
189 Id.
"' Id. at 55.
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though based on inconclusive precedent,"' that the Vice
President is not an agency for purposes of FOIA."' Since
Judicial Watch failed to assert any FOIA claims against the
NEPDG, the court did not have to decide whether the NEPDG
was an agency for purposes of FOIA.
In summary, the Judicial Watch court dismissed all
direct FACA claims, since the Act contains no provision for
private cause of action. Claims under the APA for FACA
violation remained against defendant cabinet members and
agency heads, but were dismissed as to the Vice President and
the NEPDG, due to plaintiff Sierra Club's concessions and
plaintiff Judicial Watch's adoption of those concessions. Claims
against the Vice President, cabinet members, and agency heads
remained under the Federal mandamus statute, as well as
claims against the NEPDG by plaintiff Judicial Watch, since
Judicial Watch alleged that the NEPDG still exists. All the
FOIA claims were dismissed on procedural grounds. Finally, all
claims against private defendants were dismissed, since FACA,
the APA, and mandamus statute are not applicable to private
persons.
D. Limited Discovery Ordered
On August 2, 2002, Judge Sullivan ordered for a second
time that the government comply with discovery or file detailed
and precise objections to "particular" discovery requests, and
"not make general invocations of privilege with respect to
categories of documents or questions, but . . . identify and
explain their invocations of privilege with particularity."'
'9' Id. (citing Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Armstrong
v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 286 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the President and Vice
President are not subject to the Federal Records Act, but rather are subject only to the
Presidential Records Act)).
As to the applicability of the FOIA to the Vice President, there is some
confusion in the law as to whether a presidential advisor constitutes an "agency"
within the definition of FOIA. FOIA includes in its definition "the Executive Office of
the President" which includes cabinet members but may not include White House staff
or non-executive "Office of the President" staff. FOIA does not apply to those agencies
whose sole function is to advise and assist the President. Even if they also advise the
President, agencies/agency heads with significant operational autonomy are subject to
FOIA, unless sought-after documents fall under an existing exemption, such as
national security. Id. See also supra note 169.
192 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
193 Court Order of August 2, 2002, at 2, cited in Plaintiff Judicial Watch's
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal, Judicial Watch, 219 F.
Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. Action 01-1530), available at
http://www.judicialwatch.org/1270.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
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Instead of proceeding with discovery, the government
waited the full thirty-day response period before filing a motion
for a protective order and for reconsideration.'94 Judge Sullivan
denied the motion on October 17, 2002, saying that the
government had not provided particularized justification for its
request. ' He again ordered the parties to proceed with limited
discovery, requiring that the government individually state and
justify" a claim of privilege for each document or information
request. The government then moved for a stay while it
pursued an interlocutory appeal of the October 17, 2002
order.'9 7 Judicial Watch opposed the motion, noting "numerous
attempts by Defendant to delay this case."98 In its filing,
Judicial Watch noted that the government's delaying had
already guaranteed that any information ultimately released
would come after the 2002 elections, potentially a calculated
tactic on the part of the government to avoid any damage such
release might engender.' In light of the repeated delays, and
the potential injury accrued, Judicial Watch prompted the
court to fashion relief "in furtherance of the public interest."' °
194 Plaintiff Judicial Watch's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for a Stay
Pending Appeal at 2, Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. Action
01-1530), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/1270.shtml (last visited Oct. 10,
2003).
'95 Order Denying Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order and for
Reconsideration Pending Appellate Review, Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C.
2002) (No. Civ. Action 01-1530), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/1270.shtml
(last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
'96 Id. See also supra notes 145-46.
197 In support of its appeal, the government relied upon Cuomo v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n., 772 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1985), which named four
factors for consideration, though none are prerequisites: (i) the likelihood the party
seeking the stay will prevail on the merits; (ii) irreparable harm to that party if a stay
is not granted; (iii) harm to others if the stay is granted; and (iv) public interest in
granting the stay. Order Denying Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order and for
Reconsideration Pending Appellate Review at 3, Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20
(D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. Action 01-1530), available at http://www.judicialwatch.orgt
1270.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
198 Plaintiff Judicial Watch's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for a Stay
Pending Appeal at 2, Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. Action
01-1530), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/1270.shtml (last visited Oct. 10,
2003).
'9 Id. Plaintiff Judicial Watch further noted:
the Government's 'astonishing assertion that it is they, not Plaintiffs and the
public, that will suffer irreparable injury if their frivolous motion for a stay is
not granted. On the contrary, it is the Plaintiffs in this case and, most
importantly, the American public, who continue to be injured by the
Executive Defendants' refusal to respond to Plaintiffs' legitimate and court-
authorized discovery request regarding the operation of the NEPDG."
Id.
200 Id. at 3 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Farmworkers Org. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604,
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On November 27, 2002, Judge Sullivan again ordered that
discovery proceed over the government's objections, "the latest
step in a lengthy procedural dispute between the White House
and . . the District Court."" The government lost its
interlocutory appeal and was once again ordered to proceed
with discovery."2 In dismissing the government's appeal, a
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit Court noted that the
government's appeal was premature as it had never claimed
executive privilege, nor availed itself of any opportunity to
narrow the scope of discovery."°' The circuit court panel opined
that, upon the government's proceeding with the discovery
order, the district court would protect its legitimate interests in
privacy via "tightly reigned discovery" and in camera review as
appropriate.' Thus, the government was put back in the same
position it was in at the very first discovery ruling by Judge
Sullivan at the district court. Meanwhile, as the case
progressed, most of the provisions of the National Energy Plan
were implemented, leaving obvious questions of the efficacy of
enforcement when an executive administration, as here, is
resistant." .'
616 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
Countering the Government's motion for appeal, plaintiffs argued that, at
the district court level, appellate review of a discovery order is usually appropriate only
at conclusion of the litigation. "[Elven orders to produce information over strong
objection based on privilege are not appealable, despite the claim that once the cat is
out of the bag the privilege is gone." Id. (citing Reise v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Wis. Sys., 957 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1992)).
20' Katherine Q. Seelye, Judge Again Bars Effort to Keep Cheney Files Secret,
N.Y. TIMES, November 28, 2002, at A30.
The question is whether the White House is subject to discovery at all. The
Administration says the White House is beyond the court's reach and can't be
asked any questions. The judge rejected that. So they went to the Court of
Appeals, saying that what Judge Sullivan did was so extraordinary that it
requires their immediate intervention.
Id. (quoting Sanjay Narayan, counsel for Plaintiff Sierra Club).
2W2 In re Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, 334 F.3d
1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
18831, 18832 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 10, 2003). Following the three-judge panel's decision
denying Vice President Cheney's interlocutory appeal, the full U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit voted five to three against rehearing, issuing a one-
paragraph ruling that did not include its reasons for denial. Id.; see also Court Rejects
Rehearing Cheney Energy Case, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at A33. The Justice
Department then filed papers seeking Supreme Court review of the decision, though a
grant of such review is considered highly unlikely. Carol Leonnig, Cheney
Seeking Supreme Court Review of Energy Panel Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2003, at
A04.
20 Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 28.
205 See supra note 128.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Though agencies have generally complied with FACA,
courts have denuded its vital purpose by tentatively applying it
to the actions of presidential advisors. In the very few cases
involving presidential advisors, the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance and the resultant narrowing of FACA's scope has
created murky law, and worse, unchecked executive avoidance.
Despite the existing Supreme Court framework for
resolution of issues of separation of powers and executive
privilege, the judiciary has been unwilling to apply the
balancing test of Nixon II and Morrison in FACA cases
involving close presidential advisors." Rather, when confronted
with admittedly difficult constitutional issues, courts have
chosen to limit FACA by narrowing its scope and broadening
its exemptions through dubious statutory interpretation,"7
contra to its unambiguous purpose."'8 Without the full and
consistent support of the courts in its application, including
providing appropriate relief for violations, FACA may become a
virtual nullity, resulting in legislation that exists at the whim
of the executive branch - the sort of result that the separation
of powers doctrine seeks to prevent.
However, the current opacity calls neither for the courts
to draw a bright line that cedes a larger sphere of secrecy to the
executive branch, nor to narrow the zone of privacy in
presidential communications. Instead, the situation demands
that courts apply, in all cases, the functional standard provided
by the Supreme Court. Different outcomes under fact-intensive,
case-by-case analysis do not indicate inconsistency, but rather
are the natural result of a consistent, principled approach that
accounts for a variety of competing and legitimate concerns.
Without consistent judicial treatment, the executive branch
simply will continue to evade the statute, so long as the
political costs do not compel otherwise. The irony here,
however, is that FACA itself provides the fodder for political
206 A decision in Judicial Watch is pending as of the date of this paper, but the
Judicial Watch court has clearly identified the Nixon H/Morrison balancing test as
applicable to resolution. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
2 Public Citizen, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring, but
dissenting in part as to the majority's statutory interpretation, given the plain meaning
of the word "utilize").
208 Note the examples of Public Citizen, In re Sealed Case and AAPS,
discussed supra Part I.B.2.
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pressure. Thus, diminution of FACA reduces the potency of
political checks.
A. Drafting Flaws and Judicial Avoidance
The Supreme Court, while employing the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance in Public Citizen, voiced concern that
FACA is too broadly drafted, noting in particular the
unfettered definition of "advisory committee.' Still, most
FACA cases do not involve constitutional issues. Lower court
interpretations of FACA are both available and workable,
including interpretations of FACA's most serious drafting
flaws: the absence of a standard for judging its balanced point
of view requirement and the absence of a private remedy. As
example of the former, the courts in Cargill v. United States '
and Public Citizen v. National Advisory Committee on
Microbiological Criteria for Foods". judged the balance
requirement according to the function of the advisory group at
issue. In both cases, the end result of the advisory groups' work
was technical, not political, and thus adequate balance existed
among the highly technically qualified membership."'
Regarding remedies, the court in Alabama-Tombigbee
Rivers Coalition v. Dept. of Interior"' provided an example of
protective remedial action by enjoining use of the report
prepared by an advisory committee in violation of FACA. That
court held that "a simple 'excuse me' after the fact was
insufficient in light of the important purpose of the Act." "'
Accordingly, even though FACA suffers from drafting flaws,
there is no reason for courts to eschew the statute's commands,
as prior judicial interpretation has supplied the necessary
stopgaps.
B. Executive Branch Avoidance
Inquiry into FACA's application to presidential advisors
must include consideration of how disclosure might disrupt the
20 Public Citizen, 491 U.S. 440.
210 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999).
211 708 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1988).
.212 See supra note 104.
2';: 26 F.3d 1103 (11' h Cir. 1994).
214 Id. See also Cal. Forestry Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 102 F.3d 609 (D.D.C.
1996) (holding that injunction against use of advisory group's work product could be an
appropriate remedy on remand).
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President's ability to carry out his constitutional duties, such
as proposing legislation."'t If compliance would disrupt, the
Nixon II/Morrison balancing test then weighs the disruption
against the competing interest promoted by the statute and
borne out by the facts of the case."' With regard to FACA, this
competing interest is Congress' express purpose to make
advisory committees publicly accountable in order to fend off
special interest control over the policy-making process. Apart
from prevailing on these scales, however, the executive branch
has other ways of avoiding disclosure. Without technically
violating FACA, the executive branch can skirt its reach by
legitimately invoking its exemptions, as well as through less
legitimate means.
When considering the relative burdens of compliance,
the court must note the exemptions available to the
President.' These include, among other express exemptions,
the right to close meetings in the interest of national security
or to withhold documents related to national security or foreign
policy. The exemptions thus exclude a broad range of
communications and activities that would otherwise be open to
public scrutiny under FACA.
Further, the Supreme Court's definition of "advisory
committee" clearly excludes independently established private
organizations that exist for some primary purpose besides
giving advice to the President. Under Supreme Court
interpretation, FACA would apply only to formally organized
groups with a regular membership that have been specifically
called upon to deliver advice and recommendations to the
government," ' most particularly if that advice will be
considered exclusively in the development of national policy."
Only when such a group includes within its membership at
least one private individual does it meet the definition of
advisory committee, thus triggering FACA. Complying with the
publication and reporting requirements may be perceived as
215 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("recommend to their Consideration such Measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient").
216 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("To make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the forgoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.").
217 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
218 Public Citizen, 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
",9 See supra discussion at note 100 (citing FACA cases which deal with
formation of a group for the specific purpose of policy development).
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tedious and inefficient, and opening meetings to the public may
invite delay in proceedings, but considering the risk FACA
attempts to avoid, the burden is certainly less than onerous22
Within this framework, even without considering
exemptions available within FACA, it is fairly easy for an
administration to avoid FACA's reach by working around the
Act's technical provisions."l Such defensive action on the part of
the executive branch unfortunately provides entree for special
interests and would likely be a bad faith violation of the Act's
purpose. For example, the executive branch could simply stall
FACA proceedings to delay compliance until rights under
FACA are rendered moot, or until a more politically expedient
time to cooperate arises. Additionally, the requisite limited
charter time of advisory committees eliminates action against
the group post-termination, another means to avoid political
accountability.
Without consistent enforcement of FACA provisions,
there is limited risk in non-compliance. Further, when
mootness doctrines or a court's weak analysis limits available
remedies,2' a violating agency has nothing to fear unless the
media and public exert pressure. This, however, is the crux of
the problem, and points out the need for FACA. FACA itself
provides the information that allows the public to serve as a
political check on the activities of government. Thus, an
administration hostile to FACA's open government purpose can
achieve its goal to sidestep the Act without asserting privilege
and without specifically addressing the constitutional issues, if
any." ' The result is unchecked executive power. By virtue of the
220 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
221 The court of Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. also
suggests this:
Since form is a factor, it would appear that the government has a good deal of
control over whether a group constitutes a FACA advisory committee.
Perhaps, for that reason, it is a rare case when a court holds that a particular
group is a FACA advisory committee over the objection of the executive
branch. In order to implicate FACA, the President, or his subordinates, must
create an advisory group that has, in large measure, an organized structure,
a fixed membership, and a specific purpose.
AAPS, 997 F.2d 898, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
222 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
223 This result disposes of Justice Scalia's discussion in his dissenting opinion
in Morrison that argues against the balancing test applied by the majority. Morrison,
487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988). Justice Scalia argues that political pressure alone, not
intrabranch policing, must be relied upon to address potential criminal acts within the
executive administration. Such an argument fails when asserted against FACA, since
FACA's purpose is to make government transparent to enable the forces of political
pressure to build when appropriate. Without public access to the workings of
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burgeoning size of the administrative arm of government,"4 this
power has increased dramatically in the years since FACA's
introduction."' In sum, the various avenues of executive
avoidance, combined with inconsistent and often watered-down
court interpretation, have significantly eroded FACA's purpose
and protections, accumulating that lost power in the executive
branch.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Though FACA has quietly done its work, enjoying fairly
consistent compliance and support at the agency level since its
enactment in 1972, it can more fully protect the public interest
in openness with active support from the judiciary. Specifically,
the courts can utilize existing FACA precedent to fill statutory
gaps with regard to the balance requirement. More
importantly, the courts must be willing to apply FACA in
situations involving groups which advise the President, using
Supreme Court precedent as necessary to justify - or deny - its
application. Finally, the courts must continue to exercise their
equity powers in fashioning appropriate remedies for FACA
violations.
A. Interpret FACA in Favor of its Broad Purpose and
Narrow Exceptions
By consistently applying precedent, courts can clarify
the limited definition of "advisory committee," which properly
excludes certain private organizations from FACA's reach.
Such a limited definition comports with the Act's purpose and
government, such political pressure is forestalled. Id. See supra notes 41, 74.
224 "Approximately 10,000 advisory committees [are] in existence at any given
time." General Services Administration, Committee Management Secretariat, The
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) Brochure, available at
http'//www.gsa.gov/Portal/content/ (last visited July 21, 2003). See generally U.S.
Government Printing Office, The United States Government Manual 2002-03,
available at http:/www.gpoaccess.gov/gmanual/index.html (providing descriptions of
the various federal departments and agencies) (last visited Aug. 23, 2003).
12' See discussion supra Part I.C. Perhaps, though, fear of loss of political
capital has eroded in the near past, as world events may have limited Americans'
appetites for protracted political showdowns. See Remember When This Would Have
Been Huge News?, THE HOTLINE (AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK), Oct. 18, 2002
(discussing Vice President Cheney's refusal to turn over NEPDG documents despite a
court order).
T26 Excluded are those private organizations founded and operated for a
primary purposes beyond advising the President, such as the ABA. See supra text
accompanying note 84.
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findings, and the Supreme Court precedent of Public Citizen.
Additional case law and GSA interpretation articulates a
workable standard with which to judge the threshold issue of
FACA applicability. Courts can also clarify the problems of
FACA's omissions: the absence of a standard for judging
whether an advisory group is adequately balanced and a
provision for private remedies." ' A judicial standard that looks
to the function of the advisory group to judge whether it is
"fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented" is
appropriate and maintains the broad purpose of FACA.
Alternatively, Congress could correct this omission by adopting
this precedent by amendment, which would have the dual
benefit of reaffirming political support for FACA as well as
filling a gap. An amendment providing for a private right of
action would also be true to the express purpose of FACA to
provide access and information to both the public and the
Congress.
B. Use the Supreme Court's Balancing Test
Supreme Court precedent establishes that the courts
have the power to "say what the law is,...8 and provides the
balancing test of Nixon H/Morrison to resolve skirmishes along
the borders of power that arise under FACA. Thus, FACA is
not per se unconstitutional as applied to presidential advisory
groups. Rather, the courts may consider the specific burden
placed on the President through disclosure, and the potential
disruption disclosure would cause to the President's ability to
execute duties under Article II. This functional approach
involves pragmatic case-by-case analysis, considering the
nature and purpose of the advisory group, and the specific topic
on which the President seeks advice. In weighing the relative
burden, the courts must consider both the measurable burden
of regulatory compliance and the unquantifiable burden of
impairing a President's ability to receive candid advice,
including whether this advice comes directly or through the
conduit of close presidential advisors who are in turn advised
by others.
27 Omitted from the text of FACA is provision of private remedy or a
standard for judging whether an advisory committee is balanced in terms of
represented point of view. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
228 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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For advisory groups that meet FACA's definition, the
readily measurable burden is the administrative cost of
complying with FACA's regulatory procedures. This includes
providing public notice and access to meetings and
information."' It is an administrative burden to be sure, but
one shared equally by all agencies, and factored into staff and
budgetary allowances. Moreover, if an agency violates FACA,
the burden of the release of documents and information may be
made more difficult by passage of time, requiring retrieval of
archived information, for example. Because an offending
agency can control this cost, the additional burden would not
weigh in the government's favor. As seen in Judicial Watch,
the government's failure to release information on the makeup
of the NEPDG and the information and documents produced by
the NEPDG undoubtedly compounded the government's
burden when ordered to produce these later. More importantly,
such delay may also increase the harm to plaintiffs and impact
appropriate remedies.
Regarding the unquantifiable burden on the President's
ability to receive frank, candid advice from advisors, the
Supreme Court's functional approach should control, since
there is no "airtight" separation between the branches."° The
courts should thus weigh what, if any, chilling in
communications will result in light of the nature and purpose
of the advice sought and the distance of the advice-giver from
the President when such advice is not directly proffered.
Further, FACA's exemptions, which encompass express Article
II powers such as national security, foreign policy, and
discretionary and statutory exemptions,"2 ' carve out a broad
swath of protection, notably leaving domestic policy making
open to public scrutiny.
When required to weigh the burden on the President for
FACA compliance, as in Judicial Watch, a court should
consider how, if at all, individual members of a policy advisory
group might temper their speech. If members have a public
position on particular issues, as would an environmental or
energy industry lobbyist, it is less likely that a chilling effect
would follow from application of FACA, since it could be
expected that the same advice would be offered in the role of
229 See supra text accompanying notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
S :" See supra text accompanying note 64.
231 See supra notes 32-35.
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presidential advisor. Further, if advice was sought on a
sensitive topic, such as policy for the security of nuclear
reactors, existing exemptions to FACA would apply and such
advice would not be open to public dissemination.3 Thus, as
applied to a fact pattern similar to that of Judicial Watch, the
public interest in accessing the sources and content of domestic
energy policy advice would outweigh any chilling effect.
It is essential that FACA's scope not be peremptorily
limited in cases involving advisory committee
recommendations to the President or his close advisors,
circumstances where FACA is most crucial to keeping special
interests at bay. In this scenario, courts should use the Nixon
H/Morrison balancing test. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
nearly said as much in its In re Sealed Case opinion, even as it
extended FACA exemptions to communications of the
President's advisors on constitutional grounds. By limiting its
decision to the facts of the case, the court did not rule out a
functional approach by the lower courts.
The balancing test is appropriate because the
recommendation clause... does not, as the government argued
in Judicial Watch, "give[] the President the sole discretion to
decide what measures to propose to Congress, . .. leav[ing] no
room for congressional interference. " '" Rather, because the
boundaries between the branches are not airtight, the
balancing test properly determines, on a case-by-case basis,
whether a FACA request impermissibly disrupts the
President's ability to propose legislation. Attempting to fashion
a bright line that concisely divides the executive and legislative
branches would inevitably offset the balance of powers, tipping
it too far towards the executive branch and the ever-growing
administrative apparatus under its direction.
23 See supra notes 32-33.
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("He shall from time to time give to the Congress
Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such
Measure as he shall judge necessary and expedient").
"u Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 48 (D.D.C. 2002) ("The Executive
Branch has long argued for a more formalistic understanding of the separation of
powers doctrine than the Supreme Court and other courts have been willing to
accept."). In support of this statement, the Judicial Watch court cites to Nixon I, 418
U.S. 683, 706-07 (1974), Nixon 11, 433 U.S. 425, 441-44 (1977), and AAPS, 997 F.2d
898, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 48.
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C. Provide a Real Remedy to Induce Timely and
Meaningful Compliance
Judicial Watch involved an open question of fact as to
whether FACA applied at all, since the government claimed
that all members of the NEPDG were government employees."'
In a similar, hypothetical case, two factors would impact the
harm caused by the violation and its appropriate remedy: the
timing of the litigation and the nature of the advisory group's
work product. If, as was the case in Judicial Watch, litigation
follows the termination of the advisory group and execution of
its recommendations, some rights under FACA become moot.3
These include provisions for notice of the existence and purpose
of the advisory group, access to its meetings, and the ability to
contribute to its dialogue. Still, as in Judicial Watch, some
rights survive even after termination."3 Surviving rights
include access to generated reports, meeting minutes, and
attendance records. Thus, injunction is still an available and
appropriate remedy, as is declaratory judgment to clarify the
plaintiffs rights, which may serve to encourage future
compliance.
Apart from consideration of the timing factor in
assessing the nature of harm rendered, timing also plays a role
in assessing the extent of harm. For example, in Judicial
Watch, before proceedings began, the NEPDG had already
released its report and Congress had considered and enacted
parts of it." This compounded the harm to the plaintiffs and to
the public at large, as the public lost the opportunity to access
and influence the group's workings in the first place, and
because those workings became law in the second place."'
05 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
236 See supra text accompanying note 170.
237 Id.
238 For example, as of November 2003, provisions of the National Energy Plan
that recommended downward alteration in coal emissions standards have been
promulgated in the form of the Environmental Protection Agency's new rules for "New
Source Review" that provoked a multi-state lawsuit. See Seth Borenstein, U.S. Eases
Pollution Rules to Spur Work on Power Plants, CENTRE DAILY TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at
B9; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
239 Plaintiff Judicial Watch's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for a Stay
Pending Appeal at 5, Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. Action
01-1530) (rebutting the government's assertion that the plaintiffs will not be harmed
by further delay of proceedings since plaintiff Judicial Watch exists for the express
purpose of "educat[ing] the public about the conduct of public officials . . .through
requests for information like the ones at issue here"), available at
http://www.judicialwatch.org/1270.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
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Additionally, the Judicial Watch plaintiffs complained that the
government had enhanced the harm through its delay of
proceedings as legislative and regulatory activity continued
throughout the protracted discovery and appeals process. 4" In
particular, the government's delay in complying with the
court's discovery order until after the 2002 elections greatly
increased potential harm,"' in that the voting public had no
access to the basis of important domestic policy and could not
cast fully informed votes.
The intended purpose of an advisory group's work
product also impacts the extent of potential harm of an FACA
violation and in turn its remedy. Because FACA provides no
guidance for judging violations of its balance requirement, the
court may instead look to the internal purpose of the advisory
group to assess the proper balance. 4 ' Advice on a plan for
domestic energy policy, as proffered by the NEPDG in the
Judicial Watch example, has pervasive national impact. Widely
diverging viewpoints exist on the topic of what the nation
should do to meet its energy needs. 4' Most frequently, the
energy industry and environmentalists occupy polar extremes.
Including the viewpoints of one major interest group while
excluding opposing voices, as the Sierra Club claimed had
happened in Judicial Watch, violates FACA's balance
requirement in a manner that should trigger a more
comprehensive remedy.
While all violations of FACA warrant remedy, bad faith
violations warrant the most severe remedy: enjoining use of the
advisory group's end product. Similar to the award of punitive
damages in tort law, when a court finds that a FACA violation
is in bad faith, enjoining the government's use of the advisory
committee's work product is appropriate both to reverse harm
where possible and to serve as an example across agencies to
induce future compliance. This essentially forces the managing
agency or government official to start over and seek advice in
timely compliance with the terms of FACA. For example, as
applied to Judicial Watch, such a severe remedy would enjoin
240 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 199.
242 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (discussing managing
agencies' ability to utilize their own internal guidelines for judging the balance of an
advisory group).
24:1 See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists, Clean Energy Blueprint, A
Smarter National Energy Policy for Today and the Future, available at
http://www.ucsusa.orglenergy (Oct. 2001).
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the government from using the NEPDG's policy
recommendations that became the National Energy Plan,
forestalling further legislation and regulatory action and
forcing the process to begin anew.
When a plaintiff can show that a defending agency
deliberately employed techniques to delay or avoid compliance,
or skewed the represented viewpoints in favor of special
interest so that the advisory group could not be called
"balanced," such a severe penalty may be warranted. For
example, the plaintiffs in Judicial Watch alleged that the
government deliberately evaded FACA's notice requirements to
deny the public the chance to attend meetings.44 This, if
proven, epitomizes a calculated violation.
Deliberately misrepresenting group membership can
also show intentional violation. For example, in the Judicial
Watch case, the government initially refused to name the
members of the NEPDG and then only later provided a list of
members, a list comprised exclusively of government
employees. If, as the plaintiffs alleged, there were in fact
private members of the NEPDG (or the group included any
private person as a de facto member,4 ' which can be shown by
attendance records and meeting minutes), deliberate violations
occurred. Additionally, an administration may deliberately
attempt to evade the definition of "advisory group" by denying
the existence of private members within the advisory
committee, by simply not including them in the membership
roster, by establishing non-advisory subgroups,"' or by
soliciting their input only outside of "regular" meetings."7 In
244 Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 36 (D.D.C. 2002) (listing plaintiffs
claimed FACA violations).
241 AAPS, 997 F.2d 898, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See discussion supra note 140
and accompanying text.
246 GSA regulations essentially establish such a loophole for subgroups. This
is not supported by case precedent or legislative history. Croley & Funk, supra note 18,
at 474-75.
247 An interview of Vice President Cheney on Nightline by Ted Koppel
exemplifies this:
Koppel: ... What is the difference about what Hillary Clinton did with the
health program from what you folks did with the energy policy?
Cheney: She brought in outsiders, people who were not government
employees, who were not full-time...
Koppel: You didn't do that?
Cheney: No.
Koppel: No outsiders?
Cheney: Well, not as part of the deliberating process.
Koppel: Well...
Cheney: No, that's very important.
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Judicial Watch, for example, plaintiffs alleged that the
government freely practiced this avoidance technique when it
held repeated informal meetings with certain energy industry
insiders and then incorporated the substance of those
conversations in its formal deliberations. Walking a similarly
fine line of legality, use of unofficial subgroups of private
individuals shows bad faith, if not deliberate violation -
ostensibly a matter of degree. A further example of actions that
fall in a gray area of legality is administrative foot-dragging
that creates delay sufficient to avoid significant political
impact. As discussed in Judicial Watch, plaintiffs alleged that
the government engaged in this behavior (successfully) to avoid
compliance until after national elections took place.2 8 Clearly,
many devices to evade compliance exist, some in obvious
violation of law, but many on the borderline. In the fact-
intensive inquiry the Act demands, considering motivation is
thus essential for determining the appropriate remedy for
FACA violations.
VI. CONCLUSION
While there may be nothing wrong with a President
making domestic policy recommendations received directly
from special interest groups, the public has a right to know
Koppel: ... Are you finessing that just a little bit too finely?
Cheney: No. No, you're misreading what the statute IFACA] says. There's a
big difference. We meet all the time behind closed doors to make economic
policy or to make education policy. Now, you may deal with outside groups.
They may have points of view they want to represent. We heard from energy
people. We heard from consumer groups. I met with congressmen and
senators and governors. We heard from a broad variety of folks out there, but
they were not in the meetings where we put together the policy and made
recommendations to the President. That's the big difference.
Koppel: Isn't that a fine point?
Cheney: That's a very important point.
Koppel: In other words, if we ... have one meeting here.., with a bunch of
people, and because of your background and the President's background in
the energy industry yourselves . . . the assumption is that you did consult
with a lot of your pals in the energy industry. If you consult with them in this
room, and then you adjourn to the next room to make policy, that...
Cheney: That's not the way the law works.
Koppel: That satisfies the law?
Cheney: ... That is not the way it worked...
Koppel: But why not just take the wind out of the sails of all of your critics
and say, 'Here's a list of the people we consulted?
Plaintiff Judicial Watch's Second Amended Complaint at 9-11 (quoting ABC broadcast
of "Nightline" on July 25, 2001), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/1270.shtml
(last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
248 See supra notes 199, 240.
[Vol. 69: 1
20031 DRAWING THE CURTAIN ON OPEN GOVERNMENT 393
when this occurs. Moreover, the public has a compelling need
to know in order to effectively participate in the democratic
process. FACA codifies this right, and its provisions and
penalties should apply when the risk of special interest capture
is at its apex: when an advisory group is the exclusive source of
the President's policy recommendations. Thus, consistent
judicial oversight, both of FACA's applicability and its
remedies, is essential to ensuring the Act's purpose. Courts can
ensure that government remains open and accountable by
applying the Nixon II/Morrison balancing test on a case-by-case
basis. Continued and consistent application of FACA at all
levels of government would arm the public with its sharpest
weapon: "the power which knowledge gives.""9
Carolyn Bingham Kello'
249 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910), quoted in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l
Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 52 (D.D.C. 2002). See supra text
accompanying note 1.
1 B.A., Pennsylvania State University; J.D. candidate, 2004, Brooklyn Law
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